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AN ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES ARISING
FROM EASTERN ENTERPRISES V. APFEL
Richard H. Seamon"
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article examines jurisdictional issues arising from
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.' Part II of the Article focuses on
the part of the Eastern Enterprisesopinion in which a plurality
of the Court held that the federal district court had jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs claim for declaratory and injunctive relief
under the Takings Clause.2 Part II concludes that in two respects the plurality's holding on jurisdiction will cause needless
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; J.D., Duke University. This Article is based on one presented at the Spring 1999 Symposium of the
Court of Federal Claims, When Does Retroactivity Cross the Line: Winstar, Eastern
Enterprises and Beyond. I changed the title of this Article from that of the presentation so that the title more accurately describes the contents. I have also changed
parts of the content to reflect what I hope are refinements in my thinking. I thank
the Honorable Eric Bruggink, Judge of the- United States Court of Federal Claims,
for inviting me to participate in the symposium.
1. 524 U.S. 498 (1998). Eastern Enterprises involved the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 1992 ("Coal Act" or "Act7), 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 &
Supp. I1 1997). The Act required the plaintiff, Eastern Enterprises, to pay money
into a privately operated fund for the health care costs of its former employees and
their dependents. Eastern Enters., 524. U.S. at 512-17. (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (hereafter cited as "plurality opinion7). The
company brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Coal Act. Id. at
520 (plurality opinion). The company argued that, as applied to it, the Coal Act
violated the doctrine of substantive due process and had "taken" its property within
the meaning of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 516.
Four members of the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the Coal Act's application to
Eastern [Enterprises] effects an unconstitutional taking." Id. at 537 (plurality opinion). A fifth Justice held that, although the Act did not violate the Just Compensation Clause, it did violate substantive due process. Id. at 539-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
2. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 519-22 (plurality opinion). This part of the
plurality opinion did not command a majority. See id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (finding it "unnecessary to comment
upon" the plurality's jurisdictional analysis).
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confusion and that in a third respect it is wrong. Specifically,
the plurality's jurisdictional holding will generate unnecessary
confusion about: (1) when federal district courts can hear takings cases and (2) what issues they can decide in those cases. In
addition, the plurality's jurisdictional holding is wrong in enjoining a federal statute on the ground that the statute has "taken"
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.3 Part III
examines an issue that partakes of jurisdiction and that arises
from the Court's opinions on the merits in Eastern Enterprises.
The issue is whether the Court of Federal Claims can award
compensatory relief for government action that has taken private property if a federal district court has previously held that
the same government action is unconstitutional on other
grounds. Part III concludes that the Court of Federal Claims can
grant compensatory relief in that situation, as long as the government action is not "ultra vires".

II. THREE PROBLEMS WITH THE PLURALITY'S
JURISDIcTIoNAL ANALYSIS

The Eastern Enterprises plurality upheld the district court's
jurisdiction based on a presumption.4 The plurality presumed
that the plaintiff, Eastern Enterprises, could not sue in the
United States Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act 5
because the Coal Act had withdrawn Eastern Enterprises' Tucker Act remedy.' That presumption effectively forced Eastern
Enterprises to seek relief in the federal district courts. The
plurality's presumption reflects a reasonable understanding of
congressional intent, and it justified district court jurisdiction
over the takings claim asserted in Eastern Enterprises. There
are nonetheless three problems with the plurality's jurisdictional
analysis. First, the plurality should not have endorsed district
court jurisdiction in two earlier takings cases: Babbitt v.

3. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
4. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 520-21.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(aXl) (1994).
6. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 520 (holding that the relief requested was not
within the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
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Youpee' and Hodel v. Irving.' Second, the plurality should have
clarified, or at least acknowledged the lack of clarity, in its precedent concerning what a district court should do when it determines that a Tucker Act remedy is available for the taking claim
that has been asserted in the district court. Third, the plurality
should not have upheld the award of a permanent and unconditional injunction against the Coal Act on the ground that the Act
caused a taking of Eastern Enterprises' property.
A

The Presumptionof Tucker Act
Unavailability

The plurality in Eastern Enterprises was right to adopt a
presumption; furthermore, that presumption supported district
court jurisdiction in that case. The plurality observed that the
federal statute challenged in that case, the Coal Act, required
regulated entities to transfer funds to another entity.9 (The receipt of the funds was a privately operated but statutorily recognized entity called "the Combined Fund" that used the funds to
pay the health care costs of former coal miners and their dependents.)" The plurality reasoned that, when Congress enacts
such a transfer-of-funds statute, it could not intend the entity
who pays out the funds to be able to turn around and sue the
United States under the Tucker Act to recover those funds."
The plurality accordingly determined that when an entity asserts a taking challenge to a transfer-of-funds statute in federal
district court, the court should not presume that a Tucker Act
remedy would be available in the Court of Federal Claims. 2
Instead, "the presumption of Tucker Act availability must be

7. 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
8. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
9. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion) ("The payments mandated by the Coal Act, although calculated by a Government agency, are paid to the
privately operated Combined Fund.").
10. Id. at 514.
11. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion) ("Congress could not have contemplated that
the Treasury would compensate coal operators for their liability under the Act, for
'[elvery dollar paid pursuant to a statute would be presumed to generate a dollar of
Tucker Act compensation.m ) (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 493 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala, 516 U.S. 913 (1995)).
12. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion).
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reversed where the challenged statute, rather than burdening
real or physical property, requires a direct transfer-of-funds
mandated by the Government.""3
To begin with, it is important to note that the plurality's
presumption about transfer-of-funds statutes is a tool of statutory interpretation. It reflects a judgment about what Congress
intends when enacting such a statute." It posits that Congress
intends a transfer-of-funds statute to trim back the Tucker Act.
In other words, the presumption is that the transfer-of-funds
statute partially and impliedly repeals the Tucker Act. As such,
this new presumption carves out an exception to the presumption against implied repeals. 5 Given the longstanding nature of
the presumption against implied repeals, one can fairly ask
whether the new presumption is justified. One might say that
the old presumption against implied repeals creates at least a
mild presumption against the new presumption of Tucker Act
unavailability!
The new presumption reflects a reasonable understanding of
Congress' intent. It recognizes that, when Congress compels a
person to pay money, Congress probably does not want that
person to be able to get the money back using the Tucker Act.
As the plurality observed, the person's Tucker Act claim "'would
entail an utterly pointless set of activities.'"'7 This becomes apparent when considering how the Tucker Act could have been
used, had it been available, in the Eastern Enterprisessituation.
The Tucker Act generally authorizes only awards of money.18 If
Eastern Enterprises wanted to sue under the Act, it would have

13. Id. (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d at 493).
14. See id (presuming what "Congress could not have contemplated").
15. See, e.g., United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168
(1976) (citing the "cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored").
16. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 105 (1869) (relying on the canon
disfavoring implied repeals).
17. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion) (quoting Student
Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 913 (1997)).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983) (finding that,
to be cognizable under the Tucker Act, "[t]he claim must be one for money damages
against the United States"), cited in Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion).
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had to wait until it had paid money into the Combined Fund.19
Then Eastern Enterprises could go into the Court of Federal
Claims and get an award from the Treasury of the amount it
had paid into the combined Fund.' ° It is hard to imagine why
Congress would want to require this wasteful round of litigation.
It is more sensible to presume that Congress did not want a
plaintiff like Eastern Enterprises to have a Tucker Act remedy
to recover the funds that a later statute required it to pay out.
B. Problem One: The Plurality'sFailureto Explain Why the
Presumptionof Tucker Act UnavailabilityCreatedDistrictCourt
JurisdictionOver the Takings Claim
Although the plurality explained why it is reasonable to
presume that Congress wants to take away the Tucker Act remedy when it enacts a transfer-of-funds statute, the plurality did
not clearly explain why the absence of a Tucker Act remedy
made it proper for the district court to take jurisdiction over
Eastern Enterprises' takings claim. In the absence of a clear
explanation, there will continue to be confusion about when
district courts can assert jurisdiction over takings claims.
Here is why the absence of a Tucker Act remedy made it
proper for the district court to assert jurisdiction over the takings claim: The Fifth Amendment requires the government, at
the time of a taking, to provide "adequate assurance" that it will
pay just compensation.2 Such adequate assurance is lacking
when Congress withdraws the Tucker Act remedy, and it is
lacking even when there is a reasonable doubt about whether
such a withdrawal has occurred. The Court in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.' held that, when
there is doubt about whether there has been such withdrawal,
the district courts have statutory authority to provide adequate

19. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521.
20. It is possible that, ancillary to an award of compensation for past payments,
the Court of Federal Claims could order the federal government, in the future, periodically to cut a check to Eastern Enterprises for future payments to the Combined
Fund. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(aX2).
21. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124 (1974); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890).
22. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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assurance of just compensation.'
Specifically, the district
courts have power under the federal question statute' 4 and the
Declaratory Judgment Act' to determine and declare whether
Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act remedy with respect to
a particular takings claim.' If a district court decides and declares that Congress has not withdrawn the Tucker Act remedy,
however, its job is complete. The declared availability of the
Tucker Act remedy provides adequate assurance of just compensation. The district court should then dismiss the takings claim
as premature.27
There are two important points in this explanation. First,
when a district court is presented with a takings challenge to a
federal statute, the district court should initially determine
whether a Tucker Act remedy is available. Second, when the
district court decides that a Tucker Act remedy is indeed available, the district court should dismiss the case because the determination of Tucker Act availability triggers the principle,
often stated by the Supreme Court, that the existence of a Tucker Act remedy renders a takings claim in district court premature.' I will refer to this principle as the "prematurity principle."
The Eastern Enterprisesplurality was not clear on either of
these points. First of all, the plurality did not emphasize the
need for district courts, as a threshold matter, to determine
whether a Tucker Act remedy is available. To the contrary, the
plurality cited with apparent approval two cases in which district courts did not make that threshold determination: Babbitt
v. Youpee 9 and Hodel v. Irving.0 These cases involve takings
challenges to the Indian Land Consolidation Act ("ILCA7).3'
The ILCA was not a transfer-of-funds statute. Accordingly, the

23.
24.

See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 71 n.15.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).

25. Id. § 2201 (1994).
26.
27.
28.
County
29.

See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 71 n.15.
See id. at 94 n.39.
See, e.g., Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) (quoting Williamson
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985)).
519 U.S. 234 (1997).

30. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
31. See Youpee, 519 U.S. at 237-43 (describing the statute challenged in that
case and in Irving).
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presumption of Tucker Act unavailability that the Eastern Enterprises plurality adopted did not justify the district courts'
assertion of jurisdiction in those cases.3 2 There may nonetheless
have been fair room for doubt about whether Congress had withdrawn the Tucker Act when it enacted the ILCA. If so, then the
district courts should have addressed that issue before reaching
the takings issue. The Eastern Enterprisesplurality implied that
the district courts have no such obligation by citing Youpee and
Irving with approval.' That implication, in turn, arguably implies that, contrary to the prematurity principle, district courts
can decide a takings claim even if a Tucker Act remedy is available on the claim. The plurality compounded the problem by describing the prematurity principle as something that its precedent "c[ould] be read" to establish, as if the matter were in
doubt. 4
To sum up the first problem with the plurality's analysis:
The plurality should have clarified that district courts confronting a takings claim should first explicitly determine whether a
Tucker Act remedy is available. The plurality's failure to make
that obligation clear will perpetuate confusion about when district courts can hear takings claims. It bears emphasis, though,
that regardless of what the plurality said or failed to say, it did
the right thing itself by addressing Tucker Act availability as a
threshold matter. Thus, the lower courts, with respect to the
issue of when they can hear takings claims, should pay attention
to what the plurality did, rather than what it said.

32. The district courts were arguably justified in asserting jurisdiction based on
the federal government's concession that a Tucker Act remedy was not available to
the plaintiffs. See Brief for the Petitioners at 13 n.5, Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S.
234 (1997) (No. 95-1595); Brief for the Appellant at 25 n.16, Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987) (No. 85-637); see also Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The
Missing Pieces of the Debate Over Federal Property-Rights Legislation, HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. (forthcoming Spring 2000) (discussing Youpee and Irving).
33. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 521-22 (1998).
34. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521.
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C. Problem Two: The Plurality'sFailureto Acknowledge
Inconsistent Precedent on Whether District Courts Can Decide
Takings Claims to which a Tucker Act Remedy is Available
The plurality in Eastern Enterprisesfailed to address clearly
this question: What should a district court do when it determines that a Tucker Act remedy is available for a takings challenge to a federal statute? Specifically, should it decide whether
the challenged statute actually causes a taking? The Court's precedent on this question points in different directions. In Duke
Power and Preseault, the Court declined to decide whether a
federal statute caused a taking once the Court had decided that
a Tucker Act remedy was available.' In Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto,36 on the other hand, the Court reached the takings
issue even though it found a Tucker Act remedy available. All
three of these cases were brought in district courts. Duke Power
and Preseaultsuggest that, if a Tucker Act remedy is available,
a district court should not address the takings issue, but
Monsanto suggests the contrary.3 7

35. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39
(1978); Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
36. 467 U.S. 986, 1004-14 & 1017-19 (1984).
37. See Bay View, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d 1281, 1285 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing "a common and oft-overlooked error" by federal courts in determining when
they have jurisdiction to address takings claims and tracing that error to Court's
precedent); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 492 (2d Cir. 1995) ("On their face,
the Supreme Court's decisions on federal Takings Clausejurisdiction have not been
consonant."); see also Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part) (declining to join plurality's discussion of "a
jurisdictional question . . . which has divided the Courts of Appeals"); id. at 520-21
(discussing disagreement among federal courts of appeals on whether plaintiffs with
takings claims against federal government can seek relief in federal district court
without first seeking compensation). Compare Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 499 F.
Supp. 732, 743 (D. Del. 1980) (holding that the Court's precedent authorized the district court to determine whether a Tucker Act compensation remedy was available;
however, if the court determined that such remedy was available, "a declaratory
judgment or other injunctive relief on the taking issue was unwarranted"), aft'd, 641
F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), with Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Costle, 481 F. Supp. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (suggesting that, without regard to
availability of compensation, the Court's precedent allowed the district court to issue
a declaratory judgment determining whether a taking was caused by the same statute that was at issue in Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle).
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The Eastern Enterprises plurality should have recognized
and identified the inconsistency in its precedent with regard to
the district court's power to address taking claims for which
Tucker Act remedies are available. Instead, the plurality cited
Preseault and Monsanto together as both supporting the prematurity principle." If a strong view of the prematurity principle is chosen, then Duke Power and Preseaultillustrate the proper approach and Monsanto the improper one.39 One practical
problem with the Monsanto approach is that it encourages the
development of takings law in two separate branches of the federal court system: the district courts, with review in the regional
courts of appeals, and the Court of Federal Claims, with review
in the Federal Circuit.40 In any event, the Eastern Enterprises
plurality's treatment suggests that Preseaultand Monsanto were
consistent in their application of the prematurity principle, but
they were not.4 Acknowledgment of this inconsistency would
have sensitized the lower courts to the issue and would have
been a step towards resolution.

38. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion) (citing Preseault and
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984), for the proposition that "this Court's
precedent can be read to support the... conclusion that regardless of the nature of
relief sought, the availability of a Tucker Act remedy renders premature any takings
claim in federal district court").
39. As applied to takings claims against the federal government, the prematurity principle emerges from the Court's interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994), discussed in Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 71 n.15. The
Duke Power Court interpreted the Act to allow district courts to address takings
claims against the federal government when there was an "actual controversy" (28
U.S.C. § 2201(a)) about the availability of adequate compensation for the alleged
taking. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 71 n.25. The Court also held, however, that, once a
district court determined that adequate compensation was available, it should dismiss the takings claim. See id. at 94 n.39. Despite that holding, Congress certainly
could amend the Declaratory Judgment Act to allow district courts to decide whether
action by the federal government had caused a taking, even if compensation for the
taking were available in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. See
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (in enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress was 'acting within its delegated power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress is authorized to establish") cf Rose
Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820
(1992) ("Congress could of course create an entitlement to be free of [federal] takings
in lieu of the constitutional requirement of compensation for takings.").
40. Robert Meltz, The Impact of Eastern Enterprises and Possible Legislation on
the Jurisdictionand Remedies of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, 51 ALA. L. REV.
1161 (2000).
41. See discussion supra Problem Two.
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D. Problem Three: The Plurality'sApproval of a Permanent
Injunction Based on the Takings Clause
The third problem differs from the first two, in that it involves the result reached by the plurality. The plurality erred in
approving the injunction that prevented the application of the
Coal Act to Eastern Enterprises.42 Under current law, federal
district courts cannot permanently and unconditionally enjoin
conduct by Congress or the Executive Branch on the ground that
the conduct would take the plaintiffs property for public use.'
Instead, the courts must leave the relevant political branch with
the option of engaging in the conduct that causes a taking if it
pays just compensation to the victim of the taking." The
plurality's failure to acknowledge that option might lead the
lower courts to foreclose it in future cases where one of the political branches wishes to retain it.
1. CurrentLaw on Injunctive ReliefAgainst Takings.-There
are three potential sources of authority for a federal district
court to enjoin the application of a federal statute alleged to
cause a taking: the Takings Clause itself,4" the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA")"; and the federal courts' inherent powers.47 None of those sources authorized the injunction approved
by the plurality of the Court in Eastern Enterprises.
The Takings Clause did not authorize the district court in
Eastern Enterprises to enjoin the government permanently and
unconditionally from applying the Coal Act to Eastern Enterprises.' After all, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the
government from taking private property for public use. It merely imposes conditions.4 9 The main condition is that the govern-

42. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 522 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e conclude that
the declaratory judgment and injunction sought by petitioner constitute an appropriate remedy under the circumstances, and that it is within the district courts'
power to award such equitable relief.").
43. See discussion infra Part IID.1.
44. Id.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
46. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
47. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
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ment pay just compensation for property that it has taken."e An
ancillary condition is that, at the time of the taking, the government provide adequate assurance that it will pay just compensation.5 1 The existence of the Tucker Act ordinarily provides such
assurance with respect to takings by the federal government.5 2
According to the Eastern Enterprises plurality, however, Congress withdrew that assurance from plaintiffs asserting takings
claims under the Coal Act.' The Takings Clause would therefore have authorized a federal district court to enjoin the federal

government from taking private property under the Coal Act
unless and until it gave the victims of the takings adequate
assurance of just compensation." The Clause did not, however,
authorize the unconditional injunction against enforcement of
the Coal Act.55
The APA provides no authority for a district court to enjoin

U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (holding that the Just Compensation Clause "does not prohibit
the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power").
50. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194 (1985) ("'The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it
proscribes taking without just compensation.").
51. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981) (quoting Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974) and Cherokee Nation v.
Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)); see Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194
(quoting same passage from Rail Reorganization Act Cases and Cherokee Nation).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
53. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 520-22 (plurality opinion).
54. The Takings Clause would not have authorized the district court to order
the federal government to reimburse Eastern Enterprises for past payments because
such an order would have been barred by sovereign immunity. Cf United States v.
Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 38-39 (1992) (holding that monetary payment against
the government could not be justified on in rem theory).
55. First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
317 (1987) ("Mhe government may elect to abandon its intrusion or discontinue
regulations [found to cause a taking] . . . the landowner has no right under the Just
Compensation Clause to insist that a 'temporary' taking be deemed a permanent
taking."); see, e.g., Monsanto v. Ruckelshaus 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) ("Equitable
relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public
use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against
the sovereign subsequent to the taking.") (footnote omitted); Rose Acre Farms Inc., v.
Madigan, 956 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992) ("If either a
statute or the Constitution requires compensation, one would suppose, the right way
to proceed is to order payment" rather than enjoin government action triggering
compensation.).
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the application of a federal statute alleged to cause a taking."
The APA creates a cause of action against federal agencies for
declaratory and injunctive relief,5 7 and it defines "agency" in a
way that encompasses most executive officials charged with
administering a federal statute.' Thus, the APA could conceivably authorize a property owner to sue a federal official, such as
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, charged
with administering a statute, such as the Coal Act, that allegedly causes a taking." But the APA does not expand the range of
remedies available on that sort of taking claim. The APA authorizes a district court to "set aside agency action... found to
be... contrary to constitutional right... "' This ties a court's
power to a violation of a constitutional right. As explained, the
Takings Clause does not create a right to be free from takings.
Thus, the APA does not create a cause of action for specific relief
against government action on the ground that the action causes
a taking."'

56. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
57. Id. §§ 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.... [An action] seeking relief other
than money damages" may not be dismissed on ground of sovereign immunity) &
704 ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."); see
also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997) (analyzing claims under "causes of
action . . . provided by the APA").
58. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(bXl) (1994). But cf Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788, 800-01 (1992) (holding that the President is not an "agency" for purposes of the

APA).
59. The Commissioner of Social Security was responsible for calculating the payments due from Eastern Enterprises under the Coal Act. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S.
at 514.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XB).
61. When a Tucker Act remedy is available for an alleged taking, the Tucker
Act may impliedly forbid declaratory or injunctive relief under the APA. 5 U.S.C.
§ 702(2) (waiver of sovereign immunity effected by that provision does not "confer]
authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought); cf Tucson Airport Auth. v. General
Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the Tucker Act
implied forbids APA action asserting takings claims predicated on government contracts). But cf Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1527-28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (holding that, under some circumstances, a district court could award equitable
relief on takings claims even if a Tucker Act remedy were available), vacated on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). In contrast, where Congress has enacted a
statute withdrawing the Tucker Act remedy, a plaintiff with a takings claim based
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Solely for the sake of completeness (though the author
claims no expertise on the subject), the following analysis of the
inherent powers of the federal courts is offered. The analysis is
based mostly on Marbury v. Madison.' Marbury allows a federal court to police Congress to ensure that it stays within constitutional bounds and to police the Executive to ensure that it
stays within both constitutional and legislative bounds.'
Marbury also suggests that federal courts may be able to protect
vested rights that arise from sources other than the Constitution
or federal legislation, including state law." Otherwise, Marbury
says that there exists a discretion in the Executive Branch, and

presumably in the Legislative Branch, with which federal courts
cannot interfere.'m It is hard to glean from Marbury or its progeny a basis for federal courts to do more, under the Takings
Clause, than ensure that a taking of private property is authorized and justly compensated.'

on that statute might have a cause of action under the APA. The plaintiff would not
be entitled to any greater relief, however, than that to which he or she would be
entitled directly under the Just Compensation Clause.
62. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
63. See Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Power and the Separate Treatment of
Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL.
L. REV. 155, 202-06 (1998).
64. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 162-63 (stating the principle that law should provide a
remedy for a violation of a vested right).
65. See id. at 166 (recognizing that certain actions by a President's agents entail
political discretion that can never be examined by the courts); id. at 170-71 ("any
application to a court to control" exercise of executive discretion by head of a department "would be rejected without hesitation!).
66. In Arellano v. Weinberger, the en bane D.C. Circuit held that a federal court
could grant equitable relief based on a taking claim when "the gap between [the
plaintiffs injury] and the monetary compensation available through a Tucker Act
remedy is so great that an unconscionable injustice would be worked ...
* 745 F.2d
1500, 1528 (1984). The D.C. Circuit seems to adhere to that holding, even though
the judgment in Arellano was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court on other grounds.
See Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (granting petition for
certiorari, vacating the court of appeals' judgment, and remanding to the court of
appeals for reconsideration in light of later legislation); see also Transohio Say. Bank
v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(discussing the Arellano holding with apparent approval but determining that the
holding was inapposite in case before it). In any event, the holding in Arellano is
consistent with my position, if that holding is understood to permit injunctive relief
against government action that not only constitutes a taking of private property for
public use but also violates some other constitutional doctrine, such as that of substantive due process.
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2. The Effect of Eastern Enterprises on Current
Law.-Assuming that the Coal Act took Eastern Enterprises'
property, the district court should have enjoined the government
from applying the Act to Eastern Enterprises only if the government failed to compensate Eastern Enterprises adequately. The
district court's failure to condition the injunction in this way did
not matter in the Eastern Enterprises case. The plurality's approval of the unconditional injunction may nonetheless lead
lower courts astray in future cases where it does matter.
The award of an unconditional injunction did not matter in
Eastern Enterprises because the federal government probably
would not have exercised the discretion that it would have retained under a conditional injunction. The Coal Act took Eastern
Enterprises' property, the plurality held, by requiring Eastern
Enterprises to make payments into the Combined Fund. It is
inconceivable that the federal government would have wanted to
require Eastern Enterprises to continue making those payments
if the government had to reimburse Eastern Enterprises for
every dollar that it paid into the Combined Fund. It is inconceivable for the same reason that it was fair to presume that Congress withdrew the Tucker Act remedy when it enacted the Coal
Act.
The plurality could have explained that it upheld the unconditional injunction against the Coal Act only because Congress
would not want to continue to apply the Act if continued application were conditioned on government payment of compensation.
Instead, the plurality merely remarked that the injunction was
"an appropriate remedy under the circumstances," without specifying what those circumstances were.67 The circumstances
should be understood to be restricted to cases in which the federal statute that has caused a taking has also withdrawn the
Tucker Act remedy. Unfortunately, the plurality's opinion does
not compel such a restricted reading. To the contrary, the plurality encourages a broader reading when it cites with apparent
approval cases in which district courts "granted equitable relief
for Takings Clause violations without discussing the applicability of the Tucker Act.' ° Those citations, coupled with the affir-

67.
68.

Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 522 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 521 (citing Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1997) and Hodel
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mance of the district court injunction entered in that case, may
plausibly be read to authorize district courts unconditionally to
enjoin federal conduct that causes a taking regardless of whether a Tucker Act remedy is available. When a Tucker Act remedy
is available, however, the government may want to pursue its
conduct even if it is has to compensate people for takings caused
by that conduct. The federal courts have no power under current
law to foreclose that option, yet the EasternEnterprisesplurality
could be read to suggest that they do.69
In United States v. Winstar," the Supreme Court illustrates the point. Winstar examined a change in federal law that
prevented the federal government from honoring contracts with
certain financial institutions.7 ' Some of the institutions claimed
that the government's breach of the contracts took their property.72 Those institutions may have eschewed compensation in favor of injunctive relief that forced the government to honor its
contracts by refraining from applying the new law to them. By
the same token, the government may have preferred to pay
compensation in order to subject the institutions to the new law.
Unless the government's preference violates the Constitution or
some federal statute or regulation, federal courts lack power to
forbid it.73 In that situation, the government's choice represents
political discretion that, under Marbury, is not subject to federal
judicial control.74
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987)). The plaintiffs in both Youpee and Irving
sought injunctive relief against a federal statute in federal district court on the
ground that it took private property for public use. See Youpee, 519 U.S. at 242;
Irving, 758 F.2d at 1262. The U.S. Supreme Court in each case affirmed the lower
courts' holdings that the statute caused a taking. See Youpee, 519 U.S. at 242, 245
(affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, which had affirmed the district
court decision awarding injunctive and declaratory relief on the plaintiffs' taking
claim); Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710, 718 (affirming the court of appeals' judgment reversing the district court decision, which rejected the plaintiffs' suit for injunctive relief
based on a takings claim).
69. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 498 (plurality opinion).
70. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
71. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 871.
72. See Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967
F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that financial institutions in Winstar's situation had often asserted takings claims).
73. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
74. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137 at 171 ("[Any application to a court to control [exercises of executive discretion by head of a Department] would be rejected without
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Indeed, if the Eastern Enterprises plurality opinion is read
to support a contrary conclusion, the opinion would be inconsistent with Winstar and the separation-of-powers principles underlying it. 7' A plurality of the Court in Winstar in effect adopted a
presumption about what the government promises to do if it
enacts a new law that prevents it from honoring a contract.
Under that presumption, the government promises to pay damages; it does not promise to refrain from applying the new law to
its contracting party."' Two other Justices in Winstar were similarly reluctant to presume that "the sovereign... shed[s] its
sovereign powers just because it contracts."7 7 That reluctance
accords with the long-standing rule barring specific performance
against the government. 8 That rule, in turn, serves separationof-powers principles. 9 By the same token, the Eastern Enterprises plurality opinion would conflict with those principles if it
were read to authorize permanent and unconditional injunctive
relief against government conduct on the ground that the conduct caused a taking."
III. JURISDICTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
OPINIONS ON THE MERITS

The plurality's jurisdictional analysis raises questions about

hesitation.").
75. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 861.
76. See id. at 868-70 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor and Breyer, JJ.).
77. Id. at 929 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined in relevant part by Ginsburg,
J.).
78. See Seamon, supra note 63, at 155 n.3 (citing commentary recognizing longstanding rule barring specific performance against the government); id. at 159-74
(discussing case law developing the rule).
79. See id. at 197-217.
80. The "no injunction" rule discerned in the Takings Clause and precedent construing it prevents only injunctions that are based solely on the ground that a federal statute causes a taking (or breaches a contract). The rule does not prevent injunctions on some other ground. Thus, if the Coal Act violated substantive due process,
as Justice Kennedy believed, that violation would have justified an injunction preventing enforcement of the Act against Eastern Enterprises. See Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701 n.25 (1949) (disapproving of the reasoning in Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926), and suggesting that the grant of
specific relief in Goltra may have been justified by proof that government conduct
was "an arbitrary taking of property without due process of law"); see also Goltra,
271 U.S. at 550 (discussing due process claim).
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the power of federal district courts to address and remedy takings claims in light of the possible availability of a remedy in
the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. The decisions
on the merits in Eastern Enterprises likewise raise a question
about the respective powers of the district courts and the Court
of Federal Claims in cases involving takings claims.
The Justices' views on the merits in Eastern Enterprises
may encourage plaintiffs -to join takings claims against the federal government with claims based on substantive due process
or other constitutional grounds.8 ' Four Justices held that the
Coal Act effected an unconstitutional taking, and a fifth held
that the Act violated substantive due process." Although four
other Justices found no violation of substantive due process,
they recognized that the doctrine of substantive due process
limits "an unfair allocation of public burdens."' That recognition, coupled with Eastern Enterprises' victory, could lead to
more cases that combine takings challenges with substantive
due process challenges. These mixed challenges will not necessarily concern only transfer-of-funds statutes. They may also
involve regulatory takings cases and statutes like the ILCA.
These mixed challenges will generally have to be litigated in
two separate fora and involve two different types of relief. A
federal district court will have subject-matter jurisdiction over
the substantive due process claim. Because of sovereign immunity, the district court can grant only declaratory and injunctive
relief on that claim. The district court will not have jurisdiction
to decide the takings claim or to award compensation on that
claim (if it exceeds $10,000).' The plaintiff's takings claim, in
contrast, will (if it exceeds $10,000) have to be litigated in the
Court of Federal Claims (assuming that Congress has not withdrawn the Tucker Act remedy or displaced Tucker Act jurisdiction in a particular case). The Court of Federal Claims generally
will have authority only to grant compensatory relief.'

81. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 498.
82. See supra note 1.
83. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 558 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(aX2) (1994) ("Little Tucker Act").
85. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983) (finding that the
Tucker Act generally authorizes only monetary relief). But cf 28 U.S.C. § 1491(aX2)
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An issue that could arise in this dual-forum litigation is
whether the unconstitutionality of the government action precludes a claim that the same government action has caused a
taking. Until recently, the Court of Federal Claims had held
that the government action underlying a takings claim must be
lawful." Those holdings suggested that a plaintiff could not get
both compensatory relief for federal conduct that had caused a
taking and prospective relief against a continuation of the conduct on other constitutional grounds. This precedent has been
only partially superseded by the Federal Circuit's decision in
Del-Rio DrillingPrograms,Inc. v. United States. 7 Del-Rio reaffirms that "[a] compensable taking arises only if the government
action in question is authorized. " ' Even after Del-Rio, a takings claim will not arise from government conduct that is ultra
vires5 9
There is a plausible argument that government action is
ultra vires if it is unconstitutional. The argument has particular
force when the government action is that of the executive branch
(as is true in many regulatory takings cases). The argument that
unconstitutional executive action is ultra vires finds support,
among other places, in the Ex parte Young line of cases."
Those cases, of course, generally allow a federal court to enjoin a
state official from violating federal law.9' To justify that relief
despite state sovereign immunity, the Court has said that a
state cannot authorize its officers to violate federal law. The

(allowing the Court of Federal Claims to grant limited equitable relief).
86. See, e.g., Crocker v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 191, 195 (1997) ("To state a
takings claim in this court, however, the plaintiff must concede the lawfulness of the
actions of the Government that resulted in the alleged taking.") (emphasis added);
Torres v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 212, 215 (1988) ("[T]he United States Claims
Court still would not have jurisdiction if the plaintiff asserts that the acts of the
government leading to the alleged taking were unlawful or unauthorized") (emphasis
added).
87. 146 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Vereda, Ltda. v. United States, 41
Fed. Cl. 495, 499 n.3 (1998) (describing a portion of Torres v. United States, 15 Cl.
Ct. 212 (1988), as "no longer sound law").
88. Del-Rio, 146 F.3d at 1362.
89. See id. at 1363.
90. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
91. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). But cf Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 280-87 (1997) (holding that, in that case, a federal
statute precluded relief under Ex parte Young).
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officer who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his [or her]
official or representative character."9 This sounds like ultra
vires conduct, and similar reasoning can be found in some
Supreme Court cases involving federal executive officials." If
unconstitutional executive action is ultra vires, then one could
argue that, under Del-Rio, that action cannot cause a taking and
hence cannot support a takings claim.95 Under this line of argument, a takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims would be
defeated by the prior decision of a district court that the government action underlying the takings claim was unconstitutional.
This possibility is raised only to be rejected. The key to
resolving this issue is the Supreme Court's decision in Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp." The Court said in
Larson that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for specific
relief against a federal officer in two situations: (1) if the
officer's conduct "is not within the officer's statutory powers," (2)
"or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise
in the particular case, are constitutionally void."97 It was only
the first situation-executive action that exceeded the
executive's statutory authority-that the Larson Court described
as ultra vires." Larson described unconstitutional executive
action as void, but not as ultra vires. In cases after Larson, the
Court has emphasized that Larson recognizes two distinct categories of executive action that support specific relief.'

92. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
93. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 144 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When an official acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute [under Ex parte Young], the absence of valid authority leaves the official ultra
vires his authority.").
94. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 715
(1982) (White, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (reading Larson
to mean that "unconstitutional actions by [government] officers could not be considered the work of the sovereign").
95. Cf. Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The govern.
ment action upon which the takings claim is premised must be authorized, either
expressly or by necessary implication, by some valid enactment of Congress.") (emphasis added).
96. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
97. Larson, 337 U.S. at 702; see also id. at 689-91.
98. See id. at 689.
99. See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994) (rejecting argument
that unauthorized official conduct was "ipso facto in violation of the Constitution
and observing that "we have often distinguished between claims of constitutional
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The distinction matters for purposes of takings claims. If an
official violates statutory limits on his or her authority, the
official's action cannot support a takings claim. If the official
acts within the general scope of his or her statutory authority,
his or her actions can support a takings claim, even if they are
unconstitutional. Likewise, an Act of Congress that causes a
taking of private property for public use triggers an obligation to
pay just compensation, even if the Act violates some other constitutional provision.
The proper approach is illustrated in a 1998 decision by
Judge Smith in Vereda, Ltda. v. United States.'" The plaintiff
there asserted that an administrative forfeiture not only caused
a taking of its property but also violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on excessive fines.1 ' The court found jurisdiction over the takings claim while finding none over the excessive-fines claim. 0 2 This would have been the proper disposition
even if a district court previously had upheld the excessive-fines
claim. In a situation like this, the Court of Federal Claims could
hear a claim for any temporary taking that occurred before the
government action was held invalid, and enjoined by a district
court, under some other constitutional provision.

violations and claims that an official has acted in excess of his statutory authority"
and citing Larson, among other cases); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621 (1963)
(describing Larson as creating two exceptions to the rule barring officer suits under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity); see also United States v. North Am. Transp. &
Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 (1920) ("In order that the Government shall be liable
[for just compensation] it must appear that the officer who has physically taken
possession of the property was duly authorized to do so, either directly by Congress
or by the official upon whom Congress conferred the power."); Hooe v. United States,
218 U.S. 322, 331 (1910) (framing the issue as whether a federal officer can "impose
liability upon the Government [for just compensation], in the absence of authority
from Congress"); cf Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
327, 330 (1922) (implying that plaintiffs would not be able to recover for a taking if
they were "unable to establish authority on the part of those who did the acts to
bind the Government by taking the land").
100. 41 Fed. Cl. 495 (1998).
101. See Vereda, 41 Fed. Cl. at 507-08.
102. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Justice Kennedy correctly hinted in his opinion in Eastern
Enterprises that it was unwise for the plurality to address a
jurisdictional issue that had not been fully briefed and that had
divided the federal courts of appeals."° The plurality's analysis
of jurisdiction will perpetuate confusion and disagreement about
when district courts can hear takings claims and what issues
they should decide when they do. More serious is the plurality's
erroneous approval of a permanent and unconditional injunction
against the enforcement of a federal statute on the ground that
it caused a taking. In the future, the Justices and other federal
judges are urged to approach this portion of the opinion with
care, recognizing that it probably did not reflect the fully considered view of a majority of the Court.
The decisions on the merits in Eastern Enterprises make it
important to resolve the question whether government conduct
can trigger a duty to pay just compensation if the conduct violates the Constitution. That question implicates the respective
jurisdiction of the federal district courts and the Court of Federal Claims. To call the question one of "jurisdiction", however,
understates its importance. The question really concerns whether the government can avoid its obligation to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment when, in taking private property, it violates some other part of the Constitution. It is hoped
that the commonsense answer, as discussed above, is the one at
which courts will arrive.

103. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (finding it "unnecessary to comment upon the
plurality's effort to resolve a jurisdictional question despite little briefing by the parties on a point which has divided the Courts of Appeals").

